Iraq’s State Sponsorship of Osama bin-Laden and the al-Qaeda Terror Network

Essay by Chris Farrell


Osama bin-Laden represents and articulates a thoroughly developed Islamist theology and philosophy with a broader appeal that goes beyond a simple hatred of Israel. He expounds and defends a religious obligation of Muslims to attack U.S. military and civilian targets; demands the immediate expulsion of U.S. Forces from Saudi Arabia; calls for the creation of a “Muslim” nuclear weapon; criticizes harshly “moderate” Muslim states such as Egypt and Jordan for not instituting “truly” Islamic law; and he also calls for the end of all sanctions against Iraq. Osama bin-Laden sees an opportunity for holy war, literally, across half of the globe.¹

The Middle Eastern terror groups of the 1970's and 1980's relied on the patronage of a number of states – principally the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact satellites – for financial backing, intelligence, weapons, explosives, training and logistics. Often these resources made their way to the terror groups through states acting as regional surrogates for the Communists. The infamous terrorist organization that captured headline throughout the 1970s and 80s, the “Abu Nidal Organization” was established in Baghdad by a Palestinian named Sabri al-Banna, whose nom de guerre was Abu Nidal. Iraqi intelligence, who at the time were trained by the Soviets, trained members of the organization. ²

Osama bin-Laden and the al-Qaeda terror network are a twenty first century variant on the model of the last sixty years. Bin-Laden’s personal fortune finances much of the organization terrorism. Bin-Laden wields influence, power and notoriety unlike other terror group leader, but there are still circumstances and occasions when his interests and those of the al-Qaeda network are best served through a sovereign state, or through the official apparatus of a state. Two prime examples are the advantages of official diplomatic status and a national intelligence organization. While recent news coverage has highlighted bin-Laden’s hijacking of the Taliban’s medieval administration of Afghanistan, that country provided bin-Laden simply with a haven, but not a political venue. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq has been bin-Laden’s active political, military and intelligence sponsor for just over three years.


Osama bin Laden had dealings with Iraqi Intelligence as early as 1993 in Somalia. During that period, various militant Islamic groups, to include bin Laden and Iraqi intelligence and military operatives, were in Somalia to organize, train and mobilize radical factions within the Somali populace. ³ In June 1994, bin Laden met with Faruq al-Hijazi, then the director of the Iraqi Intelligence Department, while in Khartoum. Iraqi concern over bin Laden’s militant Islamist zeal restrained their dealings with bin Laden and limited their willingness to provide practical support and cooperation. ⁴

Within approximately three years, Iraqi hesitance and concerns regarding bin-Laden evaporated. Pragmatic considerations, driven by the deepening political and social crises in Iraq resulting from UN sanctions as well as growing Shiite revivalism in southern Iraq and Kurdish nationalism in northern Iraq, led Saddam Hussein to reassess cooperation with bin-Laden. Bin-Laden’s charities and Islamist social services programs eased the shortfalls in food, medicine and basic necessities resulting from the UN sanctions. Arab “Afghans,” Muslim Brotherhood groups and other like-minded fundamentalist Islamists who came to Iraq in support of these new initiatives provided an ideology and structure that met Hussein’s domestic political needs and either diffused or suppressed nationalist or splinter movements. Saddam Hussein could claim credit for averting the suffering of the Iraqi people and insuring political instability at the “cost” of allowing bin-Laden a foothold in Iraq through social and religious means. ⁵

On February 22, 1998 bin-Laden announced the formation of the “World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and the Crusaders,” merging Egypt’s Jihad Group, the Islamic Group the Ansar Movement of Pakistani and the Bangladeshi Jihad Movement under one umbrella. ⁶

Bin-Laden reportedly visited Baghdad for consultations in March 1998. Giovanni De Stefano, an international lawyer visiting Baghdad on business, had a chance encounter with bin-Laden in the lobby of the five star Al-Rashid Hotel during which the two men introduced themselves and engaged in polite conversation. De Stefano did not, at the time, recognize bin-Laden’s name. Five months after the chance encounter, bin-Laden’s suicide bombers attacked the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam. ⁷

Between April 25 and May 1, 1998, two of bin-Laden’s senior military commanders, Muhammad Abu-Islam and Abdallah Qassim visited Baghdad for discussions with Saddam Hussein’s son – Qusay Hussein – the “czar” of all Iraqi intelligence matters. ⁸ Qusay Hussein’s participation in the meetings highlights the importance of the talks in both symbolic and practical terms. Iraqi commitments for training, intelligence, clandestine Saudi border crossings, as well as weapons and explosives support to al-Qaeda were a direct result of the meetings. ⁹

An outcome of the April meetings was Iraq’s commitment to train a network of bin-Laden’s operatives within Saudi Arabia. By mid-June, 1998, bin-Laden’s operatives were at the al-Nasiriyah training camp, receiving a four week course of instruction from the Iraqi intelligence and military on reconnaissance and targeting American facilities and installations for terrorist attacks. Another group was organized and trained for smuggling weapons and explosives into Saudi Arabia – and used their return to the kingdom as the first (successful) operation. A third group of bin-Laden’s Saudi operatives received a month of sophisticated guerrilla operations training later in the Summer of 1998. ¹⁰

Bin-Laden quickly sought to strengthen and reinforce Iraqi support. In mid-July 1998, bin-Laden sent Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Egyptian co-founder of al-Qaeda to Iraq to meet with senior Iraqi officials, including Iraqi vice president Taha Yassin Ramadan, to discuss and plan a joint strategy for an anti-US jihad. Baghdad pledged their full support and cooperation, on the condition that bin-Laden not incite the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood against Saddam Hussein’s reign. Zawahiri was taken to tour a potential site for bin-Laden’s new headquarters near al-Fallujah, and to observe training at terrorist camps run by Iraqi intelligence, to include the training conducted at al-Nasiriyah to bin-Laden’s Saudi operatives. Zawahiri assumed responsibility for the al-Nasiriyah training camp in the name of Osama bin-Laden, as part of Iraq’s recognition of bin-Laden as the “local authority” in the jihad against the United States. ¹¹

Both Saddam Hussein’s and Osama bin-Laden’s objectives are served through their alliance. They mutually loathe both the House of al-Saud and the United States. Bin-Laden accomplishes, as a non-state actor, what Hussein cannot and vice versa. The existence of an Iraqi-sponsored al-Qaeda capability or “wing,” poised to strike at Riyadh or regionally against US interests complicates and narrows counter-terrorism options for the United States and its allies.

By mid-November 1998, Saddam Hussein came to the conclusion, (with the advice and prompting of his son and intelligence chief, Qusay), that a campaign of terrorist attacks against the United States, under the “deniable” banner of Osama bin-Laden was the most effective means of deflecting U.S. attempts to topple the Hussein regime. Meetings between Iraqi intelligence operatives and bin-Laden in Afghanistan followed shortly. Both parties agreed to joint efforts in a detailed, coordinated plan for a protracted war against the United States. Iraq pledged further assistance with a chemical weapons expert while bin-Laden agreed to hunt down Iraqi opposition leaders who cooperated with the West against Hussein. ¹² Bin-Laden reportedly dispatched 400 “Afghan” Arabs to Iraq to fight Kurds. ¹³

In December 1998, the Clinton Administration engaged in a bombing campaign against Iraq that was viewed by many, particularly Islamist leaders, as a political distraction or “Wag The Dog” side-show to diminish or reduce President Clinton’s scandals and domestic political trouble. The launching of anti-American Islamist terrorism in retaliation for the bombing campaign was certain. Iraqi trade minister Muhammad Mahdi Salah stated that he expected “terrorist activities” against the United States to increase as a result of the bombing of Iraq. ¹⁴

The Arabic daily newspaper, Al-Quds al-Arabi, first raised the issue of cooperation between Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and Osama bin-Laden’s al-Qaeda in a late December 1998 editorial that predicted, “President Saddam Hussein , whose country was subjected to a four day air strike , will look for support in taking revenge on the United States and Britain by cooperating with Saudi oppositionist Osama bin-Laden, whom the United States considers to be the most wanted person in the world.” The editorial noted that this type of cooperation was very likely considering that “bin-Laden was planning moving to Iraq before the recent strike.” ¹⁵


Following the December air strikes, Saddam Hussein dispatched Faruq al-Hijazi to Kandahar, Afghanistan in order to meet with bin-Laden. Hijazi was the former deputy chief of Iraqi intelligence and had first met bin-Laden in 1994. ¹⁶ Hijazi offered expanded cooperation and assistance to bin-Laden, as well as a re-extension of the offer of shelter and hospitality in Iraq for al-Qaeda. Bin-Laden agreed in principle to give Iraq assistance in a revenge campaign against the United States, but suggested further study and coordination before committing to a specific course of action or agreeing to a particular terrorist strike. To demonstrate Baghdad’s commitment to al Qaeda, Hijazi presented bin-Laden with a pack of blank, genuine Yemeni passports, supplied to Iraqi intelligence from their Yemeni contacts. Hijazi’s visit was followed by a contingent of Iraqi military intelligence officials who provided additional training and preparation to the al- Qaeda terrorists in Afghanistan. These Iraqi officials included members of Unit 999 of Iraqi intelligence, who conducted advanced sabotage and infiltration training for seasoned, veteran, al-Qaeda fighters. By January 1999, al-Qaeda terrorists were being trained by Iraqi intelligence and military officers at camps on the outskirts of Baghdad. ¹⁷

Following the Hijazi meetings, Qusay Hussein dispatched representatives to follow-up with bin-Laden and obtain his firm commitment to exact revenge against America. Baghdad offered an open-ended commitment to joint operations against the United States and its “moderate” Arab allies in exchange for an absolute guarantee that bin-Laden, al-Qaeda and their fundamentalist Islamists would not overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. ¹⁸ Israeli sources claim that for the past two years Iraqi intelligence officers have been shuttling back and forth between Baghdad and Afghanistan. According to the Israelis, one of the intelligence officers, Salah Suleiman was captured last October by the Pakistanis near the border with Afghanistan. ¹⁹

In January 1999, Iraq began reorganizing and mobilizing intelligence front operations throughout Europe in support of al-Qaeda. ²⁰ Iraq’s intelligence service has operated a network of outwardly legitimate businesses across Western Europe, using them as bases for espionage, terrorism and weapons procurement. Hans Josef Horchem, former chief of West Germany’s Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (domestic intelligence service) stated that most of the Iraqi intelligence front companies are import-export firms and used-car dealerships. In the Fall of 1990, at least three firms were operating in Hamburg and the German state of Hesse – with roughly seven additional Iraqi front operations in the rest of Europe. ²¹ Iraq’s Unit 999 now increased the intensity of its operations – moving funds and people around Europe and activating previously dormant intelligence contacts and operatives. Together with intelligence officers assigned under diplomatic cover, these activated operatives began scouting safe houses, vehicles, letter drops, communications, arms caches and other logistical requirements for operations. Concurrent with this activation of Iraqi’s European intelligence assets, appeared the previously unheard of “Armed Islamic Front,” who it turned out, were made up of bin-Laden’s “Afghans” and “Bosniaks,” that would now conduct terror strikes against both bin-Laden’s and Hussein’s enemies. ²²

According to Czech intelligence sources, Mohammad Atta, the September 11, 2001 hijacking ringleader, met in June 2000 with Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani, a consul and second secretary at the Iraqi embassy in Prague. ²³ At 43, al-Ani is one of Iraqi’s most highly decorated intelligence officers: a special forces veteran and senior leader of Iraq’s “M-8," unit – the country’s “special operations branch.” ²⁴ There are additional reports of a second meeting with another hijacker – Khalid Almihdar. Czech Interior Minister Stanislav Gross has also confirmed that Atta met with al-Ani in early April 2001 in Prague. ²⁵ Atta also reportedly met with Iraqi ambassador to Turkey and former Iraqi deputy intelligence director Farouk al-Hijazi in Prague sometime in early April 2001. ²⁶ Al-Ani was expelled from the Czech Republic earlier in 2001 for espionage activities. Czech Foreign Minister Jan Kavan flew to Washington, DC to deliver the intelligence files on the meetings to Secretary of State Colin Powell.

Additional intelligence surrounding the Iraqi – Al-Qaeda connection continues to mount. The CIA reportedly believes Iraq provided falsified genuine passports for the 19 hijackers of the September 11th attacks. ²⁷ Further, senior U.S. intelligence sources say that in the spring of this year, Marwan al-Shehri and Ziad Jarrah – two of Atta’s closest associates and members of al-Qaeda’s “German cell,” met with known Iraqi intelligence agents outside the United States. ²⁸ Czech intelligence sources reported that al-Ani had been under surveillance because he had been observed apparently “casing” the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty headquarters in Prague. Czech authorities believed the site had been selected for attack by terrorists. ²⁹ The intelligence sources further report that Atta and al-Ani embraced upon meeting at Prague’s Ruzyne airport, and that Atta’s may have visited the Czech capitol on four occasions. ³⁰ Iraqi opposition leaders in Prague reported that al-Ani visited Iraqi dissidents in Prague and attempted to persuade them to return to Iraq, on one occasion allegedly threatening an Iraqi student. ³¹

Recent discoveries of anthrax in letters sent via the US Postal Service add further weight to the involvement or sponsorship of Iraq, as the Iraqi government has experience with biological and chemical weapons, including the chemical bombing of Kurds in northern Iraq that killed over 5000 people in 1998. Only the United States, Russia and Iraq could have produced a chemical additive enabling the anthrax spores to become airborne. ³² UN inspectors have repeatedly documented evidence of anthrax experiments on the part of the Iraqi government after the 1991 Persian Gulf War. UN inspectors have also identified and documented Iraqi government stockpiles of sarin and VX gas. ³³ The German newspaper Bild, citing Israeli intelligence sources, says that Atta was handed a vacuum flask of anthrax by his Iraq contact – al-Ani. Atta flew from Prague to Newark, NJ. The letters laced with anthrax that were sent to news media and politicians were posted from New Jersey. ³⁴

Italian security sources have reported that Iraq made use of its Rome embassy to foster and cultivate Hussein’s partnership with al-Qaeda. Habib Faris Abdullah al-Mamouri, a general in the Iraqi secret service, and from 1982 to 1990 a member of the “Special Operations Branch,” (M-8) charged with developing links with Islamist militants in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Gulf states, was stationed in Rome as an “instructor” for Iraqi diplomats. Al-Mamouri reportedly met with Mohammed Atta in Rome, Hamburg and Prague. Al-Mamouri has not been seen in Rome since July, shortly after he last met Atta. ³⁵


Recent Iraqi defectors provide additional details of Saddam Hussein’s support of international terrorism through the 1990s. The documentary program “Frontline,” has interviewed former Iraqi intelligence and army officers with first-hand accounts of highly secret installations run by an international terrorist known to Iraqi staffers only as “the Ghost.” ³⁶ “The Ghost” is reportedly Abdel Hussein, the chief trainer at the camp and responsible for conducting assassinations outside Iraq to support Saddam Hussein’s regime. ³⁷ The facility contained a Boeing 707 jet fuselage used to practice hijacking scenarios. UN inspectors independently confirmed the existence of the terrorist training camps. ³⁸ The Iraqi defector known as “Saddam’s Bomb-maker,” Dr. Khidhir Hamza, who served as Iraq’s Director of Nuclear Weaponization analyzes Iraqi’s sponsorship of bin-Laden as follows:

¹Peter L. Bergen, “Holy War, Inc.,” The Free Press, New York, 2001, page 37.
²Laurie Mylroie, “Study of Revenge,” American Enterprise Institute Press, Washington, DC, 2001, page 18-19.
³Youssef Bodansky, “Bin Laden; The Man Who Declared War on America,” Prima Publishing, Roseville, CA, 2001, page 323.
⁴Bodansky, page 323.
⁵Bodansky, page 323.
⁶Berger, page 95
⁷Tom Walker, “Hotel Clue Points To An Iraqi Connection,” Sunday Times (London), September 30, 2001.
⁸Bodansky, page 324.
⁹Bodansky, page 325.
¹⁰Bodansky, page 324.
¹¹Bodansky, page 324-325
¹²Bodansky, page 346-347.
¹³Daniel McGrory, “Hijacker ‘Given Flask by Iraqi Agent’,” The Times (London), October 27, 2001.
¹⁴Bodansky, page 360.
¹⁵Bodansky, page 360-361.
¹⁶Justine Smith, “Investigation Into Saddam’s Fingerprints On The Terror Attacks: The Link,” The Mirror, October 8, 2001.
¹⁷Bodansky, page 361.
¹⁸Bodansky, page 362.
¹⁹Janes.
²⁰Bodansky, page 381.
²¹Ferdinand Protzman, “German Terror Expert Says Iraqis Have Front Companies Across Europe,” New York Times, October 30, 1990.
²²Bodansky, page 381.
²³Richard Beeston, “Iraq Accuses US of Trying to Settle Old Scores,” The Times (London), October 10, 2001.
²⁴David Rose, “Focus Special: The Terrorism Crisis: The Iraqi Connection,” The Observer, November 11, 2001.
²⁵Patrick E. Tyler with John Tagliabue, “Czechs Confirm Iraqi Agent Met With Terror Ringleader,” The New York Times, October 27, 2001.
²⁶Evan Thomas, “The Manhunt: Cracking The Terror Code,” Newsweek, October 15, 2001.
²⁷Smith, ibid.
²⁸Rose, ibid.
²⁹Tyler, ibid.
³⁰McGrory, ibid.
³¹Newsweek, Periscope: “Hard Questions About an Iraqi Connection,” October 21, 2001.
³²Peter Finn, “Czech’s Confirm Key Hijacker’s ‘Contact’ With Iraqi Agent in Prague; Atta Communicated With Diplomat Who Was Later Expelled,” The Washington Post, October 27, 2001.
³³Glen Schloss, “Suspicion Falls on Saddam,” South China Morning Post, October 12, 2001.
³⁴McGrory, ibid.
³⁵McGrory, ibid.
³⁶PBS; and PBS 2
³⁷Chris Hedges, “Defectors Citing Iraqi Training For Terrorism,” The New York Times, November 8, 2001.
³⁸Tyler, ibid.
³⁹PBS 3
⁴⁰Dennis Eisenberg, “Saddam Links to Attacks,” The Herald Sun, September 23, 2001.
⁴¹Mylroie, ibid.